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International Health Financing Conference held by the « Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur 
le Développement International » (CERDI) in Clermont Ferrand, France, 1-2 December 2005 
 
The Conference brought together a range of researchers, policy makers and implementers in 
the field of health financing, with a focus on developing and countries in transition. It provided 
opportunities for an open technical debate on the efficiency and applicability of new as well as 
old health financing mechanisms, focusing mainly on approaches to achieving universal 
coverage in health care.1 Within this discussion, participants paid particular attention to issues 
surrounding user fees, health insurance, and the allocations of public budgets with a focus on 
priority health interventions.2 While it is worth emphasizing that universal coverage is achieved 
through step-by-step improvements in coverage, some of the determinants of the speed and 
mode of transition to universal coverage include sustained economic growth, a growing 
workforce in formal employment, the existence of trade unions, the availability of skilled 
personnel, the degree of solidarity in society, and government stewardship. For instance, it has 
taken the Philippines three decades to achieve near universal coverage through its model of 
social health insurance. Some of the major thematic areas of presentation and debate are captured 
below. 
 
Despite the attention currently being paid to the abolition of user fees for primary (and in some 
cases secondary) health services, the general opinion at the conference was that there exists no 
global blueprint for health financing policy. Although there is consensus that user fees are an 
inefficient and regressive form of health care financing, they are, in many instances, still seen as 
‘a necessary evil’.3 The best health financing mix needs to be assessed for each national and sub-
national context. While good examples of user fee abolition were presented (e.g. Uganda), there 
are also cases where user fee abolition did not have only positive effects (e.g. Kenya, 
Madagascar). In most of these cases, however, there exists a huge unmet population need for 
health services, as illustrated by the surge in demand after removal of user fees. In contrast, 
prepayment mechanisms offer a more equitable and ultimately more efficient way of financing 
health care, as opposed to collection of revenues at the point of service delivery. In the absence 
of such mechanisms, research shows that populations prefer to pay user fees in exchange for 
quality services rather than to receive free but poor quality services. 
 
Health insurance, for its part, represents an important potential for moving towards universal 
health care coverage, including in low-income settings.4 Some studies reveal that the selected 
insurance model must be carefully evaluated based on contextual factors. For example, health 
                                                 
1 WHO defines universal coverage generally as “access to appropriate care when it is needed and at affordable cost”. 
The main functions relating to health care financing for universal coverage include revenue collection, pooling of 
resources, and health service purchasing. 
2 Other themes also featured in the presentations and debate, such as how to enhance provider performance through 
improved systems of governance and salary supplement schemes. 
3 This was the position of the World Bank in the 2004 World Development Report ‘Making Services Work for Poor 
People’, where it stated its position: no blanket policy on user fees. 
4 Note that a precondition of health insurance is that there exists a fee for health services: only if health services are 
charged for does there provide a financial incentive to take out health insurance. 
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insurance organized at the community level and supplemented with public funds is more 
appropriate for low-income populations and the informal sector, as it potentially provides access 
at low cost to major unserved parts of the population. In contrast, as incomes rise and more 
people are employed in the formal sector, other models of health insurance become relevant, 
such as social, national and/or private health insurances. Additionally, the coexistence of 
multiple insurance schemes can increase administrative costs and burden, especially at lower 
level facilities where capacity is limited. 
 
The financial viability of community health insurance (CHI) received special attention in the 
presentations and debate. CHI suffers the problems of all voluntary insurance schemes – those of 
adverse selection and moral hazard5, although empirical evidence on the former is stronger than 
on the latter. CHI schemes are financially risky, given the low premium rates that must be set to 
encourage poor people to insure themselves, and the fact that people tend to join only if they 
expect to gain financially from membership (in other words, adverse selection). This explains 
why many CHI schemes in low-income countries are made financially viable only through the 
availability of resource inputs (subsidies) from either donors or governments. Over the long 
term, as incomes gradually increase, so does the financial viability of insurance schemes. 
Moreover, once populations become familiar with insuring their health, it makes it easier to 
move to other models of health insurance. 
 
Concerning donor financing, opinions differ as to whether it should be viewed as sustainable in 
heavily aid-dependent countries. While some delegates cited examples of poor predictability and 
stability of donor funds compared to other forms of health financing, other delegates showed 
how donor financing stability is on the rise and conditionality / earmarking on the decline. The 
advent of new donors and donation mechanisms has increased funds available, which are now 
also being pledged for longer time periods. For countries where aid modalities are more 
‘advanced’ (e.g. sector-wide approach), the advent of global health initiatives has brought 
valuable additional resources but has challenged existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. 
Tanzania, Uganda). Further, researchers claim that Global health initiatives have had a negative 
effect on governance as resources generally remain outside government control and the new fund 
flow distorts resource allocation preferences of the recipient countries; furthermore, current 
resource allocations do not capture well some important health issues, such as reproductive 
health. 
 
Can the ideas generated at this conference resolve some of the problems of health financing, 
provider motivation and quality of care? What schemes are worthy of greater study or even 
increased scale-up? For answers to these questions and more, visit www.research-matters.net and 
download Dr. Hutton’s full paper on the subject of the Clermont-Ferrand conference. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Adverse selection: people are more likely to take out insurance if they consider it likely they will use the services, 
and thus make a net gain. Moral hazard: once people are insured, they are more likely to use the service, hence 
pushing up health care costs, and the insurance premium that is needed to pay for the costs.  
